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Abstract
We investigate the coexistence of formal and informal markets. In formal markets, we
assume sellers can publicly advertise their prices and locations, whereas in informal
markets, sellers need to trade through bilateral bargaining so as to remain anonymous
from the taxing authority. We consider two models. As a benchmark, we first only
allow sellers to switch between markets, which enables us to derive some analytical
results that show the existence of a stable equilibrium where formal and informal
markets coexist. We also establish that some sellers will migrate from the formal
market to the informal market if the formal market’s advantage in quality assurance
erodes, or the government imposes higher taxes and regulations in the formal market,
or the risk of crime and/or confiscation decreases in the informal market, or the number
of buyers in the informal market increases. Some sellers will migrate from the informal
market to the formal market whenever the opposite changes occur. We then allow both
sellers and buyers to switch between markets. In this model, we illustrate that if the
net costs of trading for sellers in the formal sector and buyers in the informal sector
have opposite signs, then there is a unique locally stable equilibrium where formal and
informal markets coexist.
1 Introduction
While the definition of informal economies is subject to some disagreement, there is never
any debate that sellers in these markets strive to remain anonymous from taxing and regu-
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lating authorities.1 This simple and basic fact that sellers operate in the informal economy
to avoid detection by authorities has very important implications on the type of trading pro-
tocols that these sellers can use to attract buyers. This is an aspect that has not received
much attention by the literature. In this paper we explore the two most common trading
protocols used in these markets, and study their implications for the coexistence of formal
and informal activity while explicitly taking into account the strategic behavior of agents.
We then also incorporate other distinguishing features which deliver different trading costs
between formal and informal markets, such as taxes, regulation and the provision of quality
assurance in the formal market, and the risk of crime and/or confiscation in the informal
market as well as the relative market tightness in these markets.
Bargaining was the predominant trading protocol until 1820s. The use of posted prices by
sellers is a relatively recent phenomenon. Its ascent and eventual widespread use date back
to 1823, when Alexander Stewart introduced posted prices in his New York City ‘Marble
Dry Goods Palace’, which quickly grew to become the largest store in the U.S.2 The main
differences between these two trading protocols are their implied informational requirements.
It is important to note that informative advertising is crucial for price posting to be effective.
In order to attract buyers, price-posting sellers need to send informative signals describing
their product, price, and —more importantly —their location. Such detailed information
is observed by competitors, potential buyers, and the taxing authority as well.3 Hence,
firms that post prices cannot avoid the taxing authority’s attention. Clearly, the public
observability of price posting is incompatible with informal activity, as the latter requires a
degree of anonymity. Thus, in order to remain hidden from the taxing authority, informal
sellers need to use a trading protocol that requires minimal public information about their
whereabouts. Bargaining offers such a possibility for informal sellers. Hence, once sellers
and buyers meet in decentralized markets, they simply bargain with each other. Since there
is no credible and effective public commitment to any prior price announcement, for both
parties there is always the possibility to renegotiate.
Given the crucial role of informational requirements associated with the different trading
protocols, in this paper we explore the consequences of having price posting and bargaining
in different markets. In particular, we study the coexistence of formal and informal activity
as an equilibrium outcome. Agents can move between markets depending on their relative
payoffs. In the informal sector, sellers and buyers split the surplus via bargaining. In the
formal sector, firms post prices publicly, while each buyer chooses which seller to visit.
Sellers producing in formal markets must be registered, and must pay their taxes. Further,
given that formal sellers cannot escape regulatory authorities and/or courts, these firms can
credibly provide quality assurance to their customers.4 In contrast, informal sellers cannot
credibly provide any quality assurance to their customers, as it would be prohibitively
1See Feige (1989, 1994) for more on this definition. For more on informal markets, see De Soto (1989)
and Portes, Castells, and Benton (1989), among others.
2Other famous merchants followed his lead soon (Scull and Fuller, 1967). Macy’s advertisements from
the 1850s stated that prior to the use of posted prices by Macy’s, “there was no regular price for anything”,
while with posted prices “even a child can trade with us” (Scull and Fuller, 1967, p. 83).
3See Bagwell (2007) for more on the evolution of advertising.
4This is consistent with anti-lemon laws enforcing certain money-back guarantees in these markets.
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costly for their customers to get such quality assurance enforced against these firms via
courts and/or regulatory authorities.
To better understand the implications of these different characteristics, we first study
the consequences of having different trading protocols, and only allow sellers to switch be-
tween markets. Within this simplified environment, Theorem 1 states the conditions under
which there is a stable equilibrium where formal and informal markets coexist. Theorem 1
also provides some comparative statics describing how the equilibrium responds to changes
in some relevant parameters. We find that some sellers will migrate from the formal to
the informal market if the formal market’s advantage in quality assurance erodes, or the
government imposes higher taxes and regulations in the formal market, or the risk of crime
and/or confiscation decreases in the informal market, or the number of buyers in the in-
formal market increases. Conversely, sellers will migrate from the informal market to the
formal market whenever the opposite changes occur in these parameters.
Next, we relax the immobility of buyers, and consider an environment where both sellers
and buyers can switch between formal and informal markets. In this richer environment,
Result 2 summarizes numerical results and qualitative analysis which show that, for a broad
range of parameter values, there is a stable equilibrium where formal and informal markets
coexist, both of nontrivial size. When the net lump-sum cost for a seller in the formal sector
relative to a seller in the informal sector and the net lump-sum cost for a buyer in the formal
sector relative to a buyer in the informal sector have opposite signs, then there is only a
locally stable coexistence of formal and informal markets. If these net lump-sum costs are
both negative, then there is only a locally stable pure formal market equilibrium; if they
are both positive, then there is only a locally stable pure informal market equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior literature.
Section 3 lays out our general modelling assumptions and presents the benchmark model
where only sellers are mobile. Section 4 describes the more complex model, where both
sellers and buyers can switch between markets. Appendix A contains proofs. Appendix B
is an alphabetical index of notation.
2 Literature Review
To estimate the size of the informal economy, the existing literature has resorted to surveys,
and has also analyzed discrepancies in data from multiple sources, such as wages paid
versus taxes raised, data from household expenditure surveys versus retail trade surveys,
and expenditure data versus income reported by the taxing authorities.5
Much less attention has been paid to the theoretical foundations of the coexistence of
formal and informal activity. Existing equilibrium analyses that study the coexistence of
informal and formal markets share the assumption that these activities are different in
nature. These differences are such that either the goods being produced are assumed to
be different, as in Aruoba (2010), or differences in enforceability of contracts in formal and
informal markets as in Quintin (2008) or the technologies used to produce the goods or the
5See Schneider and Enste (2000) for a thorough review of this literature.
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means of payment required to obtain the goods are assumed to be different as in Koreshkova
(2006), Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007) , Amaral and Quintin (2006) and D’Erasmo and
Boedo (2012).
The literature has so far not explored the importance of different trading protocols
and their implied informational requirements for the coexistence of formal and informal
activity. An exception is that of Gomis-Porqueras et al. (2012), who consider an environment
that produces a homogenous good in different markets that use different trading protocols.
Agents in decentralized markets bargain, and can evade taxes by deciding what fraction of
the trade is to be made visible to the taxing authority. In contrast to the present paper,
not all activity in bargaining markets is informal in Gomis-Porqueras et al. (2012).
3 Benchmark Model
Consider an economy with a large number of buyers and sellers. These agents trade a single
perishable commodity. At any given point in time, capacity-constrained sellers produce
at most one indivisible unit of the perishable good. Since these goods are perishable, it
is not welfare maximizing for sellers to accumulate an inventory of unsold goods. Thus
sellers “produce on demand” as is assumed in the price-posting literature (see Burdett
et al. (2001)).Buyers consume the good after purchase. The perishable commodity can
be purchased in both formal and informal markets. These markets differ along several
dimensions. In this section we consider government taxes and regulations, and provision of
quality assurance in formal markets, while crime and/or confiscation risk is faced by sellers
when trading in informal markets.
Let us assume a very large population of buyers and a very large population of sellers.6
Let b be the ratio of buyers to sellers in the whole economy; i.e. there are b buyers for
every seller. Each population of agents is split between formal and informal markets. Let
bfo be the ratio of buyers in the formal market, versus the total number of sellers in both
markets. Likewise let bin be the fraction of agents in the informal market, versus the total
number of sellers in both markets. Thus we have bfo + bin = b. Let sfo be the fraction of
sellers in the formal market, and let sin be the fraction of sellers in the informal market; this
implies sfo + sin = 1. Throughout the rest of the paper we are interested in characterizing
the properties of bfo , bin , sfo , and sin that are observed in equilibrium.
In this section, to isolate the effects of having different trading protocols across markets,
we suppose that only sellers can switch between markets. In other words, we will suppose
that bfo and bin are exogenously fixed, while only sfo and sin are endogenous.7 To see why
this simplification is plausible, at least for a short term or medium term model, note that,
while sellers’ predominant factor in deciding where to locate their business is to be close to
buyers, for most buyers accessibility to sellers is not of first order importance. Households
take into account other factors when making their location choices. These include access to
the workplace and schools and quality of the neighbourhood and commuting costs, and other
6We will mainly consider the limit as both populations become infinite.
7Later (in Section 4), we will assume that both buyers and sellers can move between markets; thus, bfo ,
bin , sfo , and sin will all be endogenously determined.
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factors, such as social class barriers.8 Thus, if one takes into account these other factors,
then the buyer’s decision on where to buy goods is less affected by the sellers’ location. In
such a situation we can think of buyers being streamed into one market or the other on the
basis of exogenous factors like physical location or education, whereas the seller’s location
is endogenous and strategic.
3.1 Preferences
Buyers and sellers have quasilinear utilities. A buyer in the formal market obtains a value
of vfobu when she consumes a unit of the good. On the other hand, a buyer in the informal
market obtains a value of vinbu when she consumes the good.
9 Thus, if the formal (informal)
market price of the good is pfo ( pin), then the formal (informal) buyer obtains a total payoff
of vfobu − pfo (vinbu − pin).
Sellers in the formal market incur a cost of cfose per unit of good produced, which includes
both labor and input costs. Thus the total payoff of formal sellers is pfo − cfose . On the other
hand, sellers in the informal market have a unit cost of production cinse .10 Thus the total
payoff of informal sellers is pin − cinse .
In order for trades to occur in the both markets, individual rationality for both the
buyers and sellers needs to hold, which requires cfose ≤ pfo ≤ vfobu and cinse ≤ pin ≤ vinbu . Let
gfo := vfobu − cfose be the measure of the total “gains from trade” in the formal market, while
gin := vinbu − cinse is the total “gains from trade” in the informal market. Without loss of
generality, we can normalize the buyer and seller’s utility functions so that gfo = 1.11 The
total payoffs that a buyer and seller receive in each market depend on the specific trading
protocol that agents face when trading in each market. If agents do not trade, then each
buyer and each seller obtains a zero payoff.
3.2 Quality Assurance
An important distinguishing feature of formal markets relative to informal ones —and one
which has not previously been emphasized by the literature —is the provision of quality
assurance. This can take many forms such as free repair/replacement, a full money-back
guarantee, on-site customer service, twenty-four hour telephone customer assistance, and/or
cash compensation for unsatisfactory product performance. Since formal sellers are mon-
itored by government authorities, and can enter into binding contracts, they can credibly
provide such quality assurance to their customers. Furthermore, because they must incur
costs to repair or replace defective merchandise, formal sellers have also financial incentives
to detect and eliminate defective products before they reach the market.
8For example, illiterate buyers will find it much more difficult to participate in the formal market as
fine print regarding the sale and quality assurance conditions do not convey any additional information for
them.
9In Section 3.2, we will explain why, in general, vinbu < v
fo
bu .
10In Section 3.2, we will explain why, in general, cinse < cfose .
11In Section 3.2, we will see that, in general, gin < gfo .
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In contrast, informal sellers cannot offer quality assurance, as they are unregistered with
the authorities, so that their service contracts and warranties would be prohibitively costly
for their customers to enforce against them via courts and/or regulatory authorities. This
also means they are less likely to incur the cost of ensuring quality during production. Thus,
goods are more likely to be defective in the informal market, and they come without quality
assurance or warranties. We suppose that, when a good is defective, it provides less utility
to the buyer. Thus, if vinbu is the expected utility to the buyer of a unit of the good purchased
in the informal market, then vinbu < v
fo
bu
Let cinse be the per unit cost of producing a unit of the good without any quality assurance,
which is the unit cost sellers producing for the informal market. Let q be the average cost
of providing “quality assurance” to the buyer. Thus the unit cost of production for formal
sellers is cfose = cinse + q (this implicitly assumes that all sellers have the same technology to
produce the good). To simplify exposition, we assume that formal sellers pass all of the the
quality assurance cost q onto the buyer.
Let the total value for the buyer of purchasing the good in the formal market be given
by vfobu = v
in
bu + α(q), where q is the money the formal seller spends on quality assurance per
unit sold and α(q) is the benefit that each formal buyer receives from this assurance. We
assume that α is increasing, differentiable, and concave, with α(0) = 0.12
Lemma A If α(·) is increasing, differentiable, and concave, and formal sellers provide the
efficient level of quality assurance, then gin ≤ gfo.
The trading protocols employed in the formal and informal markets are used as mech-
anisms for dividing the gains from trade between the buyer and the seller. Thus, the fact
that gin ≤ gfo implies that there is generally a larger surplus to be divided in the formal
market so both buyer and seller can potentially be better off. This is one of the reasons
that the formal market is attractive in the first place. It also implies that the government
can tax a fraction of up to T0 = gfo−gin of the surplus in the formal market without driving
participants into the informal market. As we shall see below, in fact the government can
safely impose taxes much higher than T0 without undermining the formal market.
3.3 Taxation and theft
Suppose the government taxes a fraction T
fo
se of the profits of each seller in the formal market.
This may take the form of income tax, or a value added tax on the sale of the goods, as they
imply the same effect. Also, the costs of complying with some regulations may be directly
proportional to the amount of goods sold. Finally, formal sellers may be exposed to legal
liability from customers, which will also be directly proportional to the amount of goods
sold. All these proportional costs can be incorporated into T
fo
se .13
12Concavity is a very reasonable assumption in this context, because α is generally bounded above:
limq→∞ α(q) = v∗ − vinbu , where v∗ is the value of consuming a “perfect” commodity, with zero probability
of defects.
13Note that any taxes which are nominally paid by the buyer in the formal market (e.g. sales tax) can
just as easily be interpreted as taxes paid by the seller (i.e. we suppose they are already factored into the
posted price), and thus, incorporated into T
fo
se .
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In the informal sector, sellers pay no taxes. But each informal seller faces a risk that
her money will be stolen. This effectively functions as a form of “income tax” on informal
sector earnings. Let T
in
se represent this effective “tax rate”. Also, some police or criminals
may demand bribes or “protection fees” which are proportional to the seller’s earnings. All
these costs can be incorporated into T
in
se .
In the next sections we study how the coexistence of formal and informal market activity
is affected by increases or decreases in T
fo
se and T
inf
se .
3.4 Matching and Trading
Formal and informal markets have different matching technologies and trading protocols as
both markets require different degrees of public information. At a given point in time, the
proportion of buyers trading in formal and informal markets are fixed. Below we provide
more details about these markets’ respective matching technologies and trading protocols.
3.4.1 Formal Market
In the formal market, each seller has a fixed location; i.e. a store. In order to attract buyers,
formal sellers advertise their posted price and location. The location and the price of each
seller are common knowledge. In order to capture these market features, we use the directed
search framework of Burdett et al. (2001). Each buyer in the formal market can visit one
seller per period, and buyers’ visits of sellers are not coordinated. Buyers are more likely
to visit the seller with the lowest posted price. But since buyers are not coordinated, they
may face more competition at these locations. If multiple buyers choose to visit the same
seller, then only one of the buyers can purchase the good, while the rest of buyers receive a
payoff of 0. On the other hand, if no buyers visit a seller, then he cannot sell his good, so
he receives a payoff of 0.
Since all buyers are ex-ante identical, we focus on the mixed-strategy equilibrium in
which buyers use the same mixed strategy to choose which seller to visit.14 Likewise, since
all sellers are also ex-ante identical, they all use the same pricing strategy. The next theorem
summarizes the main results of Burdett et al. (2001).
Theorem 0. Let m be the total number of sellers in the formal market, and let Bf be the
ratio of buyers to sellers in the formal market (so there are Bf m buyers). There is a unique
symmetric Nash equilibrium of the formal market game with the following characteristics.
All sellers post an identical price of p. All buyers use the same mixed strategy: they randomly
visit all sellers with equal probability. Let Φ be the probability that any given seller sells his
product (i.e. is visited by at least one buyer), and let Ω be the probability that any given buyer
purchases the good. Then p, Φ, and Ω are entirely determined by Bf and m. Furthermore,
if we let m→∞ while holding Bf fixed, then we get:
14This approach is common in the price posting literature.
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p(Bf ) := lim
m→∞
p(Bf ,m) = cfose + ufose(Bf ), (1)
where ufose(Bf , ) := 1− Bf
eBf − 1 . (2)
Also, P
fo
se (Bf ) := lim
m→∞
Φ(Bf ,m) = 1− e−Bf , (3)
and P
fo
bu(Bf ) := lim
m→∞
Ω(Bf ,m) =
P
fo
se (Bf )
Bf
. (4)
Intuitively, P
fo
se (Bf ) (P
fo
bu(Bf )) is the probability that any particular seller sells his goods (the
probability that any particular buyer obtains the goods) during each round of participation
in the infinite-population formal market. If a seller makes a sale in the infinite formal
market (m→∞), then his pre-tax payoff is ufose(Bf ); otherwise his payoff is 0. Thus, the
seller’s pre-tax expected payoff in the formal market game is U
fo
se (Bf ) := P
fo
se (Bf ) · ufose(Bf ).
Recall that bfo is the ratio of buyers in the formal market, versus the total number of
sellers in both markets, while sfo is the fraction of sellers in the formal market, versus the
total number of sellers in both markets. As a result, we have that Bf = bfo/sfo . Given that
the proportional tax rate paid by formal sellers is T
fo
se , the seller’s expected after-tax payoff
in the formal market is given by:
U˜
fo
se (sfo) := (1− T fose )U inse
(
bfo
sfo
)
= (1− T fose )
(
1− exp
(−bfo
sfo
))(
1− b
fo/sfo
exp(bfo/sfo)− 1
)
. (5)
Note that we write U˜
fo
se as a function of sfo only, because in this model, bfo is fixed.
3.4.2 Informal Market
Informal sellers cannot publicly advertise prices nor locations, because they are trying to
avoid government detection. As in the formal sector, each informal buyer can only visit one
seller per period, and buyers’ visits of sellers are not coordinated. The matching probabilities
are again given by the directed search model of Burdett et al. (2001). Thus, if Bi := bin/sin is
the ratio of buyers to sellers in the informal market, then equation (3) in Theorem 0 implies
that the probability that any given informal seller makes a sale during any given period
is given by P
in
se (Bi) = 1 − e−Bi . Substituting Bi := bin/sin , we get the following matching
probability for sellers:
P
in
se
(
bin
sin
)
= 1− exp
(−bin
sin
)
. (6)
Instead of trading at publicly posted prices, the informal seller and buyer negotiate a price
thereby splitting the total informal market surplus, gin . Here we assume that the informal
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seller receives a fraction η(Bi) ∈ [0, 1] of the surplus, while the informal buyer receives the
remaining fraction 1− η(Bi).15 Thus, we have uinse := η(Bi) gin . Then the resulting pre-theft
expected payoff for sellers in the informal market is given by:16
U
in
se
(
bin
sin
)
:= uinse · P inse
(
bin
sin
)
= gin η
(
bin
sin
)
P
in
se
(
bin
sin
)
. (7)
Clearly, the higher the ratio of buyers to sellers in the informal market, the stronger
each seller’s negotiating position becomes, and the better each seller will do in bilateral
bargaining. In the limit when there are infinitely many buyers for every seller, the sellers
will capture all of the surplus in the informal market. Thus, we suppose that the seller’s
bargaining power η is an increasing function, such that:17
lim
Bi→∞
η(Bi) = 1.
Recall that bin is a constant, while sin = 1 − sfo ; thus, we can regard the informal seller’s
utility as a function of sfo only. Recall that T
in
se is the seller’s expected losses due to monetary
theft in the informal sector. Thus, the relevant expect payoff for the informal sellers is:
U˜
in
se (sfo) := (1−T inse )U inse
(
bin
1− sfo
)
= (1−T inse ) gin η
(
bin
1− sfo
) (
1− exp
( −bin
1− sfo
))
. (8)
3.5 Equilibrium
Given a fixed fraction of buyers participating in the formal and informal market (bfo and bin
respectively), a seller will find the formal market more attractive than the informal market if
and only if the corresponding expected payoff is higher. Sellers will slowly migrate between
the two markets until the payoff from both markets is the same. Thus, we say the economy
is in equilibrium if and only if sfo and sin are such that
U˜
fo
se (s∗) = U˜
in
se (s∗) (9)
where s∗ ∈ [0, 1] corresponds to the equilibrium fraction of formal sellers.
There are at least three formal frameworks that lead to the equilibrium represented by
equation (9), which we now describe.
Uncorrelated, symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium. We can think of a static en-
vironment, where each of the sellers plays a mixed strategy, randomly choosing whether
to participate in the formal or informal market. Sellers cannot coordinate, so there is no
correlation between their strategies. All sellers are ex-ante identical, so they play identical
strategies, given by the probability vector (sfo , sin). Equation (9) is then equivalent to say-
ing that this profile of mixed strategies is a Nash equilibrium, as in Camera and Delacroix
(2004) or Michelacci and Suarez (2006).
15Later, in Section 4.2, we will present one possible model of this surplus division process, but there is no
need to commit to a specific model here.
16The expected utility of buyers in the informal market is irrelevant to the dynamics of this model, because
we have assumed that they are immobile.
17It would also be reasonable to assume lim
Bi↘0
η(Bi) = 0. But this is unnecessary for our analysis.
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Best response dynamics. The equilibrium described in equation (9) can also be inter-
preted in terms of agents playing an infinitely repeated game. During each round, each seller
can decide whether to participate in the formal or informal market. Sellers migrate from
one market to the other at a rate which is proportional to the payoff differential between
the two markets. Let sfo(t), and sin(t) represent the populations of formal/informal sellers
at time t, and define
s˙fo(t) := sfo(t+ 1)− sfo(t) and s˙in(t) := sin(t+ 1)− sin(t).
Then we have that
s˙fo(t) = −s˙in(t) = λse
(
U˜
fo
se
(
bfo(t)
sfo(t)
)
− U˜ inse
(
sin(t)
bin(t)
))
, (10)
where λse : R−→R is a strictly increasing function which modulates the speed of adjust-
ment, with λse(0) = 0. Typically, λse is multiplication by a positive constant.
18 We can
also consider a continuous-time version of this model, where s˙fo(t) and s˙in(t) represent the
derivatives of the functions sfo(t) and sin(t) at time t. In either case, equation (17) is the
necessary and sufficient condition for a population distribution (sfo , sin) to be a fixed point
of the dynamics.
Replicator/Imitation dynamics. As in best response dynamics, suppose there is an
infinite sequence of time periods, with trade occurring in each market during each time
period. But instead of migrating between markets in response to higher payoffs, agents
learn by imitating other agents. The more agents choose a particular strategy, and the
better they are doing relative to the average payoff, the more likely it is that other agents
will imitate their behavior.
Alternatively, we can interpret the same model in terms of successive generations of
agents. During each time period, some agents produce one or more children, and some
agents die. Children remain in the same market as their parents.19 The net reproductive
rate (births minus deaths) of each market type is determined by how much the payoff for
that market exceeds the population average payoff. To be precise, the population average
payoff for sellers at time t is given by:
sfo(t)U
fo
se
(
bfo(t)
sfo(t)
)
+ sin(t)U
in
se
(
sin(t)
bin(t)
)
,
so the reproductive rate of the formal sellers will be:
ρ(t) = (1− sfo(t))U fose
(
bfo(t)
sfo(t)
)
− sin(t)U inse
(
sin(t)
bin(t)
)
.
18If λse was an odd function, then the dynamical system would converge to equilibrium just as quickly
from either direction. Thus, the informal market would show a symmetric response to tax increases and tax
decreases, as found by Christopoulos (2003). However, λse might not be odd. For example, it might cost
more for a seller to switch from the informal market to the formal market than vice versa (e.g. because of the
need to acquire licenses, rent a retail location, etc.); this would be reflected by having |λse(r)| < |λse(−r)|
for any given r > 0. This is consistent with empirical findings by Giles et al. (2001) and Wang et al. (2012).
19Note that, in this interpretation, it is not accurate to view the model as a repeated game, since individual
agents only live for one period.
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The population of formal sellers will grow (or shrink) exponentially at this rate. Formally,
we have s˙fo(t) = λse ρ(t) ·sfo(t), where λse > 0 is some constant. This leads to the following
dynamical equation
s˙fo(t) = −s˙in(t) = λse sfo(t) sin(t)
(
U˜
fo
se
(
bfo(t)
sfo(t)
)
− U˜ inse
(
sin(t)
bin(t)
))
, (11)
where λse > 0 is a constant. Again, this dynamical equation has both a discrete-time and a
continuous-time interpretation. In either case, equation (9) is a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for a population distribution (sfo , sin) to be a “nontrivial” fixed point of the dynamics.
Here, “nontrivial” refers to the fact that the replicator dynamics always have “trivial” fixed
points where either bfo = 0 or bin = 0 and either sfo = 0 or s in = 0. However, unless
these “pure population” equilibria arise from a solution to equation (9), they are generally
unstable to small perturbations. Thus, a pure population of this type will be destabilized
as soon as even one of the reproducing agents produces a “mutant” child of the opposite
type. Thus, we can safely ignore these trivial equilibria, and focus only on the equilibria
described by equation (9).
3.6 Existence and properties of equilibrium
Let us define U˜(sfo) := U˜
fo
se (sfo)− U˜ inse (sfo) which represents the net gain of the formal market
over the informal market for sellers. Equilibrium equation (9) is equivalent to U˜(s∗) = 0.
We say an equilibrium s∗ is locally stable if U˜ ′(s∗) < 0; this implies local stability under
either best response dynamics or replicator dynamics. The equilibrium (9) is a mixed market
(non-trivial) equilibrium if 0 < s∗ < 1. The main result of this section is the following.
Theorem 1 If we satisfy the following conditions
1− b
fo + 1
exp(bfo)
<
(1− T inse ) gin
(1− T fose ) <
1
η(bin) (1− exp(−bin)) ,
then there is a locally stable mixed market equilibrium s∗ ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, if we treat
s∗ as a function of the parameters gin, T
fo
se , T
in
se , bin and bfo, then (i) s∗ is decreasing as a
function of gin, T
fo
se , and bin; and (ii) s∗ is increasing as a function of T
in
se and bfo.
Thus, for a broad range of parameters of the model, formal and informal markets of nontriv-
ial size will coexist in a stable equilibrium. Furthermore, some sellers will migrate from the
formal market to the informal market if the formal market’s advantage in quality assurance
erodes (gin increases relative to gfo), or the government imposes higher taxes and regulations
(T
fo
se increases), or more buyers migrate to the informal market (bin increases). Conversely,
sellers will migrate from the informal market back to the formal market whenever the oppo-
site changes occur in these parameters. Likewise, sellers will migrate to the formal market
if the risk of crime and/or confiscation increases in the informal market (i.e. T
in
se increases)
or if buyers migrate to the formal market (bfo increases).20
20If the total population of buyers is constant, then bfo and bin are two sides of the same coin. But
formally, we can decouple the movements of bfo and bin ; this allows us to, for example, consider a scenario
where the total population of buyers increases, but all the new buyers go to the formal market.
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4 Mobile Buyers and Sellers
Now we will relax the immobility of buyers, and consider an environment where both sellers
and buyers can switch among formal and informal markets. In other words, we treat bin
and bfo as endogenous variables, in addition to sin and sfo . As in Section 3, we also consider
factors other than the trading protocols which make formal and informal different. These
include quality assurance and government taxes and regulations in formal markets, as well
as crime and/or confiscation risk in informal markets.
4.1 Formal markets
As in Section 3.4.1, we suppose that the behaviour and the payoffs of buyers and sellers in
the formal market are described by the model of Burdett et al. (2001), as summarized in
Theorem 0. Recall that Bf = bfo/sfo is the ratio of buyers to sellers in the formal market.
Then a formal seller’s pre-tax expected utility is again given by U
fo
se (Bf ) := P
fo
se (Bf )·ufose(Bf ),
where P
fo
se (Bf ) and ufose(Bf ) are defined in equations (2) and (3).
Meanwhile, let p(Bf ) be the formal market equilibrium price from equation (1). If a
formal market buyer makes a purchase, then her payoff will be given by:
ufobu(Bf ) := v
fo
bu − p(Bf ) = vfobu − cfose − ufose(Bf )
= gfo − ufose(Bf ) = 1− ufose(Bf ) = Bf
eBf − 1 . (12)
If a buyer doesn’t make a purchase because she competed against other buyers, then her
payoff is zero. Thus, her expected payoff for participating in the infinite formal market game
is U
fo
bu(Bf ) := P
fo
bu(Bf ) · ufobu(Bf ), where P fobu(Bf ) is defined in equation (4).
4.2 Informal Markets
In this new model, informal buyers are the ones who have fixed locations (home or work-
place), and the sellers are the ones who visit them. This new feature tries to capture the
door to door selling strategy used by informal sellers in some developing countries. As in the
previous section, the matching probabilities and tie breaking rule are given by the directed
search model of Burdett et al. (2001). Here the roles of buyers and sellers reversed relative
to Burdett et al. (2001). Thus, if Si := sin/bin is the ratio of sellers to buyers in the informal
market, then the probability for a given buyer to be visited by at least one seller during any
given period is obtained by replacing Bf with Si in equation (3), to obtain:
P
in
bu(Si) = 1− e−Si . (13)
Likewise, the probability of a given seller making a sale to the one buyer he visits is given
by:
P
in
se (Si) =
P
in
bu(Si)
Si
. (14)
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In section 3.4.2, we assumed that the informal seller and buyer negotiated to split the surplus
according to proportions (η, 1−η), where η depended on the ratio of buyers to sellers in this
market.21 Now, however, we model the negotiation process more explicitly, via the Nash
bargaining model. Because of our assumptions about the utility functions of the buyer and
seller, the (bargaining) set of feasible utility allocations is the convex hull of the points (0, 0),
(gin , 0), and (0, gin), where gin is the total gains from trade to be divided in the informal
market. Thus, the Pareto frontier is the diagonal line from (gin , 0) to (0, gin). Hence, the
Nash bargaining solution, the egalitarian bargaining solution, and the Kalai-Smorodinsky
bargaining solution all yield the same outcome. Thus it does not matter which bargaining
solution we use.
The bargaining outcome will be determined by the “outside options” available to buyers
and sellers. Formally, let U
in
se be the expected payoff for a seller participating in the informal
market, and let U
in
bu be the expected payoff for a buyer participating in the informal market.
These payoffs depend on the informal seller/buyer ratio Si := sin/bin . Let δ ∈ (0, 1) be a
discount factor. If bargaining breaks down, then both parties must re-enter the informal
market during the next period. Then, in the Nash bargaining framework, the outside
option for the seller is δ U
in
se (Si), while the outside option for the buyer is δ U
in
bu(Si). The
Nash bargaining solution thus awards the seller a payoff of uinse(Si) and the buyer a payoff
of uinse(Si), where
uinse(Si) =
δ U
in
se (Si) + gin − δ U inbu(Si)
2
;
and uinbu(Si) =
δ U
in
bu(Si) + gin − δ U inse (Si)
2
.
(15)
However, we also have that U
in
se (Si) = P
in
se (Si)uinse(Si) and U
in
bu(Si) = P
in
bu(Si)uinbu(Si).
If we now substitute these expressions into (15), we obtain a pair of linear equations for
uinse(Si) and uinbu(Si). Solving these equations yields the following buyers’ payoff
uinse(Si) = gin
δ P
in
bu(Si)− 1
δ P
in
bu(Si) + δ P
in
se (Si)− 2
;
uinbu(Si) = gin
δ P
in
se (Si)− 1
δ P
in
bu(Si) + δ P
in
se (Si)− 2
;
(16)
that describe the new payoffs for the buyer and seller trading in the informal market.22
21It was not necessary to be any more specific about the negotiation process in order to obtain Theorem
1.
22If δ = 1, then the bargaining outcome (16) can be seen as a particular case of the abstract surplus-
division model considered in Section 3.4.2. To see this, let Bi := 1/Si, and let η(Bi) := uinse(Si)/gin , where
uinse(Si) is defined as in Eq.(16). Then η satisfies the conditions proposed in Section 3: it is an increasing
function of Bi (because uinse is a decreasing function of Si, and the limit (??) holds because uinse(0) = gin .
13
4.3 Asymmetric costs
As discussed in Section 3.3, T
fo
se is the effective tax rate paid by sellers in the formal market.
In this Section we also consider other exogenous costs that are incurred when participating
in these markets. During each that period a seller participates in the formal market, we
assume that she incurs a lump-sum cost of L
fo
se dollars. This cost represents the combined cost
of renting (or purchasing) retail space, paying for licensing fees and following government
regulations (e.g. fire safety codes). Note that these costs, unlike the proportional tax
T
fo
se , do not depend on earnings. Meanwhile, formal buyers incur a lump-sum cost of L
fo
bu
dollars. This represents the costs of transportation to the formal market area of the city,
the “shoe-leather costs” of visiting various merchants, etc.
Recall from Section 3.3 that each seller also faces a risk that her money will be stolen.
This possibility can be represented as an implied “tax rate” of T
in
se on her earnings. Now
we further suppose that each informal seller also incurs a lump-sum cost of L
in
se dollars.
This cost represents the costs associated with being an itinerant merchant, bribing corrupt
officials, and paying non government protection services as well as the expected cost of
having her merchandise confiscated as there are no records for these items to have any legal
claim.23 Similarly, informal buyers incur a lump-sum cost of L
fo
bu dollars which reflects the
opportunity cost of waiting around for sellers to arrive.
Let us define Lse := L
fo
se − Linse and Lbu := Lfobu − Linbu . Intuitively, Lse represents the net
lump-sum cost for sellers in the formal sector; likewise, Lbu represents the net lump-sum
cost for buyers in the formal sector.24 For modelling purposes, it is equivalent to suppose
that informal buyers and sellers face no lump sums, whereas formal buyers and sellers face
lump sums of Lbu and Lse respectively.
Let R
fo
se := 1−T fose and Rinse := 1−T inse representing the “residual” earnings rate of sellers in
the formal and informal markets after losses due to taxes, theft, etc. Let Rse := R
fo
se/R
in
se ; this
is effectively the “net” residual earnings rate for formal sellers, if we normalize the informal
sellers’ residual earnings rate to 1. For modelling purposes, it is equivalent to suppose that
that informal sellers capture all their earnings, while formal sellers only capture a proportion
Rse . This is equivalent to supposing that informal sellers face no risk of theft, while formal
sellers pay an effective tax rate of Tax := 1−Rse . Note that if expected losses due to theft in
the informal market are higher that the formal tax rate, then we will have Rse > 1, which
implies that Tax < 0.
4.4 Equilibrium
Having specified all differential costs of trading in formal and informal markets, we can
now analyze the corresponding equilibrium for this new environment. As in Section 3, a
seller will find the formal market more attractive than the informal market if and only if
(1−Tax)U fose (bfo/sfo)−Lse > U inse (sin/bin). Likewise, a buyer will find the formal market more
23Note that the informal seller pays the same bribes or protection fees whether or not her business is
successful.
24These net lump sums could be negative, if the costs in the informal sector are higher than the formal
sector.
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attractive than the informal market if and only if U
fo
bu(bfo/sfo) − Lbu > U inbu(sin/bin). Thus,
an equilibrium exists if and only if bfo , bin , sfo , and sin satisfies the following conditions:
(1− Tax)U fose
(
bfo
sfo
)
− Lse = U inse
(
sin
bin
)
and U
fo
bu
(
bfo
sfo
)
− Lbu = U inbu
(
sin
bin
)
. (17)
Since bfo + bin = b and sfo + sin = 1, we only need to solve for two endogenous variables,
namely bin ∈ [0, b] and sin ∈ [0, 1]. We can then rewrite equation (17) as follows:
(1− Tax)U fose
(
b− bin
1− sin
)
−Lse = U inse
(
sin
bin
)
and U
fo
bu
(
b− bin
1− sin
)
−Lbu = U inbu
(
sin
bin
)
, (18)
which is fully characterized by an ordered pair (bin , sin).
As in the model of Section 3, we can interpret this equilibrium in three ways. First, it
can be understood as describing a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of a game
with a large population of identical buyers and another large population of identical sellers.
All sellers are ex ante identical, so they play identical strategies, given by the probability
vector (sfo , sin). All buyers are ex ante identical, so they play identical strategies, given by
the probability vector (bfo , bin)/b. Equation (17) is then equivalent to saying that this profile
of mixed strategies is a Nash equilibrium.
Second, we can suppose that the populations of buyers and sellers in the formal and
informal markets evolve over time according to best response dynamics. This yields the
dynamical equations:
s˙fo(t) = −s˙in(t) = λse
(
(1− Tax)U fose
(
bfo(t)
sfo(t)
)
− Lse − U inse
(
sin(t)
bin(t)
))
and
b˙fo(t) = −b˙in(t) = λbu
(
U
fo
bu
(
bfo(t)
sfo(t)
)
− Lbu − U inbu
(
sin(t)
bin(t)
))
.
(19)
Here, λbu : R−→R and λse : R−→R are strictly increasing functions which modulate the
speed of adjustment, with λbu(0) = 0 = λse(0).
25 We can also consider a continuous-time
version of this model, where b˙fo(t), b˙in(t), s˙fo(t), and s˙in(t) represent the derivatives at time
t. In either case, equation (17) is the necessary and sufficient condition for a population
distribution (bfo , bin , sfo , sin) to be a fixed point of the dynamics (19).
Finally, we could suppose that the buyer/seller populations evolve according to replica-
tor/imitation dynamics. This yields dynamical equations:
s˙fo(t) = −s˙in(t) = λse sfo(t) sin(t)
(
(1− Tax)U fose
(
bfo(t)
sfo(t)
)
− Lse − U inse
(
sin(t)
bin(t)
))
and
b˙fo(t) = −b˙in(t) = λbu bfo(t) bin(t)
(
U
fo
bu
(
bfo(t)
sfo(t)
)
− Lbu − U inbu
(
sin(t)
bin(t)
))
,
(20)
25Typically, λbu and λse are are just multiplication by some positive constant.
15
where λse > 0 and λbu > 0 are constants. Again, this dynamical equation has both a discrete-
time and a continuous-time interpretation. In either case, equation (17) is a necessary and
sufficient condition for a population distribution (bfo , bin , sfo , sin) to be a “nontrivial” fixed
point of the dynamics (20). Here, “nontrivial” refers to the fact that the replicator dynamics
always has “trivial” fixed points where either bfo = 0 or bin = 0 and either sfo = 0 or sin = 0.
An equilibrium (b∗, s∗) is locally stable if it is an attracting fixed point under the best-
response dynamics described by the dynamical equations (19). In other words, there exists
some neighbourhood U around (b∗, s∗) such that, for any (bin , sin) in U , the forward-time
orbit of (bin , sin) under (19) converges to (b∗, s∗). If 0 < b∗ < b and 0 < s∗ < 1, then this also
implies that (b∗, s∗) is an attracting fixed point under the replicator dynamics described by
the dynamical equations (20).26
Graphically, it is easy to identify a locally stable equilibrium. To this end, let us rewrite
(10) in the more abstract form as follows:
b˙in = β(bin , sin)
s˙in = σ(bin , sin)
where β and σ are the functions appearing on the right hand side of the best responses
in (19). Then an equilibrium is simply an intersection of the two isoclines B := {(bin , sin);
β(bin , sin) = 0} and S := {(bin , sin); σ(bin , sin) = 0}. Typically, B and S are smooth curves
in the rectangular domain [0, b]× [0, 1] given by:
S(Tax , Lse) :=
{
(sin , bin) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, b] ; (1− Tax)U fose
(
b− bin
1− sin
)
− Lse = U inse
(
sin
bin
)}
,
and B(Lbu) :=
{
(sin , bin) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, b] ; U fobu
(
b− bin
1− sin
)
− Lbu = U inbu
(
sin
bin
)}
. (21)
The equilibrium (b∗, s∗) is locally stable if the following conditions are met in a neighbour-
hood of (b∗, s∗):
(i) The absolute slope of B at (b∗, s∗) is larger than the absolute slope of S at this point.27
(ii) β is positive to the left of B, and negative to the right of B.
(iii) σ is positive below S, and negative above S.
If the population of informal buyers unilaterally dips below (above) b∗, then Condition
(ii) says that the payoff for informal buyers will be higher (lower) than the payoff for formal
buyers, causing buyers to migrate into (out of) the informal market until bin = b∗. Likewise,
26Note that the vector field determined by (20) is obtained by multiplying the vector field defined by (19)
by a scalar function which is positive everywhere in (0, b)× (0, 1). Thus, a stable fixed point for (19) is also
a stable fixed point for (20).
27Heuristically, this means we can think of B as a roughly “vertical” curve near (b∗, s∗), whereas S is
roughly “horizontal” near (b∗, s∗).
16
if the population of informal sellers unilaterally dips below (above) s∗, then Condition (iii)
says that the payoff for informal sellers will be higher (lower) than the payoff for formal
sellers, causing sellers to migrate into (out of) the informal market, until sin = s∗. Thus, a
stable equilibrium is such that any point to the left (right) of B will move in a rightward
(leftwards) direction and any point below (above) S will move upwards (downwards).
We say there is a pure formal market equilibrium if the point (bin , sin) = (0, 0) satisfies
the equilibrium condition given by (18). We say there is a pure informal market equilibrium
if the point (bin , sin) = (b, 1) satisfies equation (18). Finally a mixed-market equilibrium
is a point (b∗, s∗) ∈ (0, b) × (0, 1) which satisfies equation (18). To establish the robust
coexistence of formal and informal markets, we must show that there exists a locally stable
mixed-market equilibrium.
4.5 Coexistence of formal and informal markets
In the next section, we examine different scenarios and their implications for the resulting
equilibria. Given the complexity of the model, no closed form solutions exist, so that
numerical analysis are required to characterize the equilibrium.
4.5.1 No taxes, no quality assurance
To isolate the implications of the trading protocol, we will first consider an environment
with Tax = 0 and gin = gfo . In other words, we initially suppose that the formal market has
no quality assurance advantage, and that neither market has a tax advantage. This would
occur, for example, if the tax rate in the formal market exactly matched the rate of theft in
the informal market, and if products had zero probability of defects or if α(q) = q for all q.
When Tax = 0 and Lbu = Lse = 0, the two curves S(0, 0) and B(0) characterizing the
stability of the equilibrium are very close to diagonals. Heuristically, this means that buyers
and sellers are both essentially indifferent between the two markets, as long as
bin
sin
= b =
bfo
sfo
. (22)
Numerical methods suggest that, in this case, buyers and sellers exhibit a very weak prefer-
ence for an all-formal market equilibrium. But the difference in payoff between the all-formal
market equilibrium and other points on the diagonal (22) is so small that all points on this
diagonal could be regarded as “quasi-equilibria”. However, if Lbu 6= 0 and Lse 6= 0, then the
picture becomes much clearer.
Result 2.
(a) If Lbu and Lse have opposite signs, and |Lbu | and |Lse| are large enough, then there is
a locally stable mixed market equilibrium.
(b) If Lbu < 0 and Lse < 0, and |Lbu | and |Lse| are large enough, then there is no mixed
market equilibrium. Instead, there is a locally stable pure formal market equilibrium.
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(c) If Lbu > 0 and Lse > 0, and |Lbu | and |Lse| are large enough, then there is no mixed
market equilibrium. Instead, there is a locally stable pure informal market equilibrium.
In all three cases, the equilibrium appears to be unique.
Result 2(a) covers two cases. We have Lbu > 0 and Lse < 0 if, for example, buyers
face entrance fees or transportation costs to enter the formal sector, while sellers must pay
bribes or protection money to participate in the informal sector. On the other hand, we
have Lbu < 0 and Lse > 0 if, for example, sellers must pay license fees in the formal sector,
while buyers experience some inconvenience in the informal sector. In either case, Result
2(a) says there will be a robust equilibrium where formal and informal markets coexist.
To understand why Result 2 is true, first observe that an equilibrium (18) is any crossing
point of the isocline B(Lbu) (from equation (21)) and the isocline
S(0, Lse) :=
{
(sin , bin) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, b] ; U fose
(
b− bin
1− sin
)
− Lse = U inse
(
sin
bin
)}
.
Let us now define the functions β, σ : [0, b]× [0, 1]−→R by setting
σ(bin , sin) := U
in
se
(
sin
bin
)
− U fose
(
b− bin
1− sin
)
β(bin , sin) := U
in
bu
(
sin
bin
)
− U fobu
(
b− bin
1− sin
)
,
for all bin ∈ [0, b] and sin ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose Lse = 0; then σ measures how relatively attractive
the informal market is for sellers. If σ(bin , sin) is positive (negative), then sellers will move
into (out of) the informal market, so sin will increase (decrease). Likewise, suppose Lbu = 0;
then β measures how relatively attractive the informal market is for buyers. If β(bin , sin)
is positive (negative), then buyers will move into (out of) the informal market, so bin will
increase (decrease). The isocontours of β are the isoclines B(Lbu) for various choices of Lbu .
The isocontours of σ are the isoclines S(0, Lse) for various choices of Lse . These isocontours
cross if and only if the gradient vector field ∇σ is not parallel to the gradient vector field
∇β. So this is what we must demonstrate to prove Result 2.
If the two gradient vector fields were parallel, then we would have
φ(bin , sin) :=
∇σ(bin , sin) • ∇β(bin , sin)
‖∇σ(bin , sin)‖ · ‖∇β(bin , sin)‖ = ±1, (23)
for all bin ∈ [0, b] and sin ∈ [0, 1]. The explicit formula for the function φ defined in
(23) is extremely complicated, and must be manipulated using a symbolic computation
package like Maple or Mathematica. However, using such a package, it is easy to check that
φ(bin , sin) 6= ±1, for any choice of (bin , sin) which is not close to the diagonal line {(bin , sin);
bin/sin = b/s}. Indeed, using a symbolic computation package, one can verify that
lim
→0
φ(b− , ) = 0.
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Figure 1: In these figures, the horizontal axis represents bin , on a scale from 0 to b, while the vertical axis
represents sin , on a scale from 0 to 1. Left. The curves B(Lbu), for various values of Lbu . Right. The
curves S(0, Lse), for various values of Lse . (Here we suppose δ = 0.99 and gin = gfo .)
In other words, if (bin , sin) is close to (b, 0) (the southeast corner of the domain [0, b]× [0, s]),
then the gradient vectors ∇σ(bin , sin) and ∇β(bin , sin) are not only non-parallel, but nearly
orthogonal, meaning that the isocontours S and B cross at right angles.28
In Figure 1, σ is decreasing as sin increases or as bin decreases, and the isocontour
along the diagonal corresponds to σ = 0. Thus, σ < 0 for points in the northwest half of
the picture (above the diagonal), while σ > 0 in the southeast half (below the diagonal).
Likewise, β is decreasing as sin decreases or as bin increases, and the isocontour along the
diagonal corresponds to β = 0. Thus, β > 0 above the diagonal, while β < 0 below the
diagonal. Thus, the crossings above the diagonal correspond to the case Lbu < 0 < Lse ,
whereas the crossings below the diagonal correspond to the case Lse < 0 < Lbu , as described
in Result 2(a).
Any crossing of the curves B(Lbu) and S(0, Lse) will determine an equilibrium (18) of the
economy. However, not all such equilibria are locally stable. If the slope of S(0, Lse) is less
than the slope of B(Lbu) when they cross, then it is easy to check that conditions (i)-(iii)
from Section 4.4 are satisfied, so that the equilibrium is locally stable. For example, Figure
2 shows the curves B(−0.5) and S(0, 0.5) intersecting in a locally stable equilibrium. Figure
3 shows the curves B(0.4) and S(0,−0.4) intersecting in a locally stable equilibrium.
Thus, there is a stable equilibrium with a mixture of formal and informal markets when-
ever the buyers and sellers face lump-sum costs in different markets. However, if both
buyers and sellers face lump-sum costs in the same market, then the curves do not cross.
28Unfortunately, it is not possible to obtain a similar asymptotic result for (bin , sin) is close to (0, 1),
because φ has a singularity there.
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Figure 2: An illustration of Result 2(a). Left. An equilibrium defined by the crossing of S(0, 0.5)
(dashed) and B(−0.5) (solid). Right. This equilibrium is locally stable under the best response dynamics
given by the dynamical equations (19). (Here we suppose δ = 0.99 and gin = gfo .)
Figure 3: Another illustration of Result 2(a). Left. An equilibrium defined by the crossing of S(0,−0.4)
(dashed) and B(0.4) (solid). Right. This equilibrium is locally stable under the best response dynamics
given by the dynamical equations (19). (Here we suppose δ = 0.99 and gin = gfo .)
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Figure 4: An illustration of Result 2(b). Left. The curves S(0, 0.1) (dashed) and B(0.1) (solid) do not
cross. Right. S(0, 0.1) is below B(0.1), so under the best response dynamics (19), the system evolves to
the pure formal market equilibrium (0, 0).
Figure 5: An illustration of Result 2(c). Left. The curves S(0,−0.1) (dashed) and B(−0.1) (solid) do
not cross. Right. S(0,−0.1) is above B(−0.1), so under the best response dynamics (19), the system
evolves to the pure informal market equilibrium (b, 1).
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(a) (b)
Figure 6: (a) For any fixed level of bin , an increase in the net tax level Tax will increase the equilibrium level
of sin . (In this picture we have fixed bin = b/2.) (b) Thus, increasing the net tax from Tax = 0 to Tax = 0.3
shifts the curve S(Tax , 0.4) upwards, so that the intersection with B(−0.4) moves to the northeast; in other
words, both buyers and sellers migrate from the formal to the informal market. In this picture we have
Lse := 0.4 and Lbu = −0.4, but we would get a similar picture for any Lbu < 0 < Lse .
In this case, the dynamics cause all buyers and sellers to migrate to the market without the
lump-sum costs. If S(0, Lse) is always below B(Lbu), then all buyers and sellers migrate to
the formal market, as described by Result 2(b). If S(0, Lse) is always above B(Lbu), then
all buyers and sellers migrate to the informal market, as described by Result 2(c). Figures
4 and 5 illustrate this fact.
4.5.2 Crime and Taxation
So far we have considered the case when the tax rate in the formal sector is exactly equal
to the crime rate in the informal sector, so that Tax = 0. Ceteris paribus, raising tax rates in
the formal sector (or lowering crime rates in the informal sector) will cause some buyers and
sellers to migrate from the formal to the informal market. To see this, consider the isocline
S(Tax , Lse) :=
{
(sin , bin) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, b] ; (1− Tax)U fose
(
b− bin
1− sin
)
− Lse = U inse
(
sin
bin
)}
for any net tax level Tax . We claim that increasing Tax will cause this curve to shift upwards.
For example, consider Figure 6(a). Here, we have fixed bin = b/2, and we suppose Lse = 0.4.
The downward sloping curve is U
in
se (b/2, sin) —the payoff for informal sellers, as a function
of sin . The upward sloping curves are the payoffs for formal sellers, as a function of sin . The
dashed curve is U
fo
se (b/2, s− sin)− 0.4; this is the payoff with Tax = 0 (i.e. no net taxation).
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(a) (b)
Figure 7: Same interpretation as Figure 6, only now Lse = −0.4 while Lbu := 0.4, and we compare the
net tax levels Tax = 0 and Tax = 0.5 We would get a similar picture for any Lbu > 0 > Lse . Note that the
effect of taxation is smaller in this case than in Figure 6.
The dot-dashed curve is 0.7 · U fose (b/2, s− sin)− 0.4; this is the payoff with Tax = 0.3 (i.e. a
net taxation rate of 30%). Note how the intersection with U
in
se (b/2, sin) shifts to the right as
we increase Tax , indicating that equilibrium occurs at a higher value of sin (i.e. more sellers
enter the informal market). By repeating this argument for every value of bin , we can see
that the curve S(0.3, 0.4) must be above the curve S(0, 0.4). Since B slopes upwards, the
intersection of S(0.3, 0.4) with the curve B(Lbu) will thus be northeast of the intersection
of S(0, 0.4) with the curve B(Lbu), as shown in Figure 6(b). In other words, higher formal
taxes will cause a larger fraction of both buyers and sellers to migrate to the informal sector.
However, as long as the net tax is small enough, the new equilibrium is still a mixed-market
type.
Figure 6 showed the case when Lse > 0 > Lbu —in other words, sellers must pay net
lump-sum costs to enter the formal sector (e.g. the costs of retail space and licenses), while
buyers pay a net lump-sum costs to enter the informal sector (e.g. inconvenience). Figure
7 shows the opposite case, when Lse < 0 < Lbu —in other words, sellers must pay a net
lump-sum costs to enter the informal sector (e.g. due to bribes and shoe-leather costs),
while buyers pay a net fee to enter the informal sector (e.g. due to transportation costs).
The impact of taxation is similar. In Figure 7(a), we again fix bin = b/2, but we now
suppose Lse = −0.4. The downward sloping curve is again U inse (b/2, sin) —the payoff for
informal sellers, as a function of sin . The upward sloping curves are the payoffs for formal
sellers, as a function of sin . The dashed curve is U
fo
se (b/2, s − sin) + 0.4; this is the payoff
with no net taxation. The dot-dashed curve is 0.5 · U fose (b/2, s− sin) + 0.4; this is the payoff
with Tax = 0.5 —a net taxation rate of 50%. Again, the intersection with U
in
se (b/2, sin) shifts
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(a) (b)
Figure 8: (a) If gin = 0.9 gfo , then all buyers and sellers migrate to the formal market because of its quality
assurance advantage. (b) The formal market remains the only stable equilibrium, even if the government
imposes 45% taxation.
to the right, indicating that equilibrium occurs at a higher value of sin (i.e. more sellers
in the informal market). By repeating this argument for every value of bin , we can see
that the curve S(0.5,−0.4) must be above the curve S(0,−0.4). Since B slopes upwards,
the intersection of S(0.3,−0.4) with the curve B(Lbu) will again be northeast of the the
intersection of S(0, 0.4) with the curve B(Lbu), as shown in Figure 7(b).
Note that the impact of taxation is stronger in Figure 6 than in Figure 7, despite the
fact that the net tax increase in Figure 7 was Tax = 0.5, whereas in Figure 6 it was only
Tax = 0.3. In other words, the effect of taxation depends on the relative lump-sum entry
costs sellers and buyers face in the formal market: taxation causes a stronger effect in a
situation when the sellers (but not buyers) must pay a net positive fee to enter the formal
market, whereas taxation causes a weaker effect when it is buyers (but not sellers) who must
pay a net fee to enter the formal market.
We have considered the effects of a formal sector tax increase (or informal sector crime
decrease), but the analysis of the opposite change is exactly analogous. If formal sector
taxes decrease (or if informal crime risks increase), then the seller’s payoff curves in Figures
6 and 7 will shift to the left, causing the market equilibrium to shift to a lower level of
informal market participation.
4.5.3 Quality assurance versus Taxation
So far all of our discussion has assumed that gin = gfo . In other words, we suppose that the
formal market has no advantage over the informal market due to quality assurance. This
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would be the case, for example, if the quality assurance technology has constant returns to
scale in Lemma A. If gin < gfo , then the “quality assurance advantage” of the formal market
creates a rent which the government can tax. For example, suppose gin = 0.9 gfo . Figure
8(a) shows a market with no net taxation and no lump-sum costs (i.e. Tax = Lse = Lbu = 0).
We see that S(0, 0) is always below B(0), so all buyers and sellers migrate to the formal
market. Figure 8(b) shows a market with no lump-sum costs (i.e. Lse = Lbu = 0), but
with a 45% net tax rate on the formal sector (i.e. Tax = 0.45), we see that S(0.45, 0) is still
below B(0), so that all buyers and sellers remain in the formal market. Thus, if the formal
market has even a small quality assurance advantage, then it can withstand a large amount
of government taxation.
5 Conclusion
A fundamental feature of informal markets is that their sellers strive to remain anonymous
from government authorities. This property has important implications on the type of
trading protocols that these sellers can use to attract buyers in these markets. This is an
aspect that has not received much attention by the literature and that we have explored.
In this paper we consider an environment with formal and informal markets where
capacity-constrained sellers produce at most one indivisible unit of the perishable good.
In formal markets, sellers can publicly post their prices and locations which buyers are
directed to, while in informal markets sellers, who cannot post their prices or locations,
have to meet and bargain with buyers in an undirected - or random - way as this reduces
their chances of being observed by government authorities. Within this environment, we
study the existence of formal and informal activity while explicitly taking into account the
strategic behavior of agents. We also incorporate various factors that affect buyers’ and
sellers’ switching decisions between formal and informal markets —factors such as taxes,
regulations and quality assurance in the formal market, versus the risk of crime and/or
confiscation in the informal market.
In our benchmark model we first assume that only sellers can switch between markets so
that the number of buyers in formal and informal markets is always fixed. When the trading
protocol is the only distinguishing feature between these markets, we can then analytically
show that formal and informal markets of nontrivial size coexist in a stable equilibrium.
This finding is robust to richer environments where formal markets are able to provide
quality assurances, pay taxes and informal sellers face the risk that their sales proceeds can
be stolen.
Once we relax the immobility of buyers, we have a less tractable environment and an-
alytical solutions are not possible. Nevertheless, this richer environment provides very
interesting dynamics in terms of general lump-sum costs and benefits of buyers and sellers
in both formal and informal markets.29
29To be more specific, this richer environment suggests that the effect of taxation depends on the relative
lump-sum entry costs sellers and buyers face in the formal market (taxation causes a stronger effect in
a situation when the sellers —but not buyers —must pay a net positive fee to enter the formal market,
whereas taxation causes a weaker effect when it is buyers —but not sellers —who must pay a net fee to
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This paper shows that an important aspect in understanding the coexistence of formal
and informal markets is to examine the different trading protocols in these markets. By
doing so we are able to explore the strategic decisions of buyers and sellers change as the
differential costs of participating in these markets are taken into account.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma A. The efficient value q∗ of investment in quality assurance is the value
such that α′∗) = 1 (i.e. such that one additional cent spent on quality assurance increases
the buyer’s expected utility by exactly one cent). Since α′ is nonincreasing (by concavity),
we have α′(q) ≥ 1 for all q ∈ [0, q∗]. Thus, since α(0) = 0, the Fundamental Theorem of
Calculus implies that α(q∗) ≥ q∗ (i.e. the benefit of quality assurance outweighs its cost).
Thus,
gfo
gin
=
vfobu − cfose
vinbu − cinse =
vinbu + α(q)− cinse − q
vinbu − cinse = 1 +
α(q)− q
vinbu − cinse ≥ 1,
because α(q) ≥ q. Thus, gin ≤ gfo . 2
Proof of Theorem 1. We must show that the interval [0, 1] contains a zero for the
function U˜ . By inspecting formulae (5) and (8), we see that, for all sfo ∈ [0, 1], we have
U˜(sfo) = U˜
fo
se (sfo)− U˜ inse (sfo) = (1− T fose ) Û(sfo),
with Û(sfo) := Û1(sfo)−K Û2(sfo),
where K :=
(1− T inse ) gin
(1− T fose ) , (24)
while Û1(sfo) :=
[
1− exp
(−bfo
sfo
)]
·
(
1− b
fo/sfo
exp(bfo/sfo)− 1
)
, by Eq.(5),
and Û2(sfo) := η
(
bin
1− sfo
)
·
[
1− exp
( −bin
1− sfo
)]
by Eq.(8).
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Clearly, it will be sufficient to find a zero for Û instead. From equation (??), simple com-
putations yield:
lim
s↘0
Û(s) = 1−K η(bin) (1− exp(−bin)) and lim
s↗1
Û(s) = 1− 1 + b
fo
exp(bfo)
−K.
From here, it is easy to check that(
K <
1
η(bin) (1− exp(−bin))
)
=⇒
(
lim
s↘0
Û(s) > 0
)
and
(
K > 1− b
fo + 1
exp(bfo)
)
=⇒
(
lim
s↗1
Û(s) < 0
)
.
(25)
But Û is continuous on [0, 1]. Thus, if K satisfies both the conditions in (25), then the
Intermediate Value Theorem implies that Û(s∗) = 0 for some s∗ ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, Û
is going from positive values (near 0) to negative values (near 1), so Û must be decreasing
near s∗; hence s∗ is a stable equilibrium.
Now, it is easy to check that the function Û2 is positive everywhere on [0, 1]. Thus, if
K increases, then the graph of Û will move downwards everywhere. Since Û is decreasing
near s∗, a downwards movement of the graph will cause s∗ to move to the left in the interval
[0, 1]. In other words, s∗ will decrease when K increases. By inspection of formula (24), K
is increasing with gin and T
fo
se , while it is decreasing with T
in
se . Thus, s∗ is decreasing with
gin and T
fo
se , and increasing with T
in
se .
Meanwhile, Û1 is clearly increasing as a function of bfo , and independent of bin . On the
other hand, Û2 is independent of bfo , but increasing as a function of bin (because η is an
increasing function, by hypothesis). Thus, Û is decreasing as a function of bin (because K is
positive by inspection of formula (24)). Thus, if we increase bfo , then the graph of Û is will
move upwards (and hence, s∗ will move to the right), whereas if we increase bin , then the
graph of Û will move downwards (hence, s∗ will move to the left). Thus, s∗ is an increasing
function of bfo , and a decreasing function of bin . 2
Appendix B: Alphabetical index of notation
α(q) Benefit (to the formal buyers) of quality assurance (e.g. warranties, free repair service, etc.)
bin Ratio of buyers in the informal market, relative to population of sellers in both markets.
bfo Ratio of buyers in the formal market, relative to population of sellers in both markets.
b = bin + bfo . Overall ratio of buyers to sellers in the whole economy.
Bf := bfo/sfo . Ratio of buyers to sellers in formal market.
Bi := bin/sin . Ratio of buyers to sellers in the informal market.
cinse Cost of production in the informal market.
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cfose Cost of production in the formal market. (Includes quality assurance, but not taxes or regulatory
compliance.)
δ Discount factor (in section 4).
η Bargaining strength of informal sellers (in section 3).
gin := vinbu − cinse . The gains from trade in the informal market.
gfo := vfobu − cfose . The gains from trade in the formal market.
L
in
bu Lump sum costs for informal buyers (e.g. inconvenience).
L
fo
bu Lump sum costs for formal buyers (e.g. transportation and shoe leather costs).
L
in
se Lump sum costs for informal sellers (e.g. crime risk, bribery, protection money, shoe leather).
L
fo
se Lump sum costs for formal sellers (e.g. regulatory compliance, license fees, rent).
Lbu “Net” lump sum costs for formal buyers.
Lse “Net” lump sum costs for formal sellers.
P
in
bu Match probability for informal buyers.
P
fo
bu Match probability for formal buyers.
P
in
se Match probability for informal sellers.
P
fo
se Match probability for formal sellers.
q Expenditure on quality assurance technology by formal sellers.
R
in
se = 1− T inse , the residual earnings rate for informal sellers.
R
fo
se = 1− T fose , the residual earnings rate for formal sellers.
Rse = R
fo
se/R
in
se , the “net” residual earnings rate for formal sellers.
sin Proportion of sellers in the informal market.
sfo Proportion of sellers in the formal market.
Si := sin/bin . Ratio of sellers to buyers in the informal market.
t Time (in dynamical interpretation of model).
T
in
se Expected costs of monetary crime for informal sellers.
T
fo
se Taxes and unit regulatory costs for formal sellers.
29
Tax “Net” tax burden for formal sellers.
uinbu Utility of a purchase for informal buyers.
ufobu Utility of a purchase for formal buyers.
uinse Utility of a sale for informal sellers.
ufose Utility of a sale for formal sellers.
U
in
bu = P
in
buuinbu , the expected utility of informal buyers.
U
fo
bu = P
fo
buufobu , the expected utility of formal buyers.
U
in
se = P
in
se uinse , the expected utility of informal sellers.
U
fo
se = P
fo
se ufose , the expected utility of formal sellers.
vinbu Value of merchandise to informal buyer.
vfobu Value of merchandise to formal buyer.
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